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State Violence and Oppositional Protest in 
High-Capacity Authoritarian Regimes
Hank Johnston, Department of Sociology, San Diego State University, United States
This examination of the mobilization-repression nexus in high-capacity authoritarian regimes draws on examples from China, Russia, Iran, and several Middle 
Eastern states to develop a framework for analyzing state violence and how political oppositions are organized. The study examines middle and low levels of 
state violence, the provincial and municipal organization of party and regime, and the police, private militias, and thugs as low-level enforcers, and focuses on: 
(1) the complexity of the state’s apparatus of repression and control and how different levels exercise different forms of violence against activists; (2) the cre-
ativity of the opposition’s actions to voice its demands and avoid repression and surveillance; and (3) the recursive relationship between the two, a dark 
dance between state and opposition with high stakes for both. Hierarchical analysis at national, provincial, and local levels, and lateral analysis across these 
levels, where elite interests frequently diverge, show that intersections and gaps on both axes can create lapses in social control and openings the opposition. 
These free spaces of speech and innovative action give rise to novel ways to keep oppositional sentiments in the public forum. The article offers several prop-
ositions for analyzing repression and state violence at various levels, and, similarly, the various ways that these free spaces occur.
In the late 1980s, Chechen nationalism was moderate, fo-
cusing on democratic reforms, cultural traditions, and 
bringing to light the history of Soviet repression. But in the 
early 1990s, sectors of the movement proposed a separatist 
agenda (Bohlen 1991). In the late summer of 1991, just a 
few months after the attempted coup d’etat by communist 
hardliners in the Moscow, a newly elected Chechen govern-
ment began to take steps towards independence. The Rus-
sian state responded by invading the region with great 
brutality in winter 1994–95. Russian planes bombed the 
capital of Grozny, and towns and villages suspected of 
being rebel strongholds were razed. Households with young 
males who might support the insurgency were terrorized 
(Gall and de Wall 1998; Dunlop 1998). This first war was 
fought to a stalemate, but in October 1999 Russia again in-
vaded with overwhelming military power. What remained 
of Grozny had been turned into a wasteland by December 
(Hughes 2007, 113; see also Tishkof 2004; German 2003). 
The indiscriminate and widespread use of force against the 
civilian population has been called genocidal, especially 
“indiscriminate bombardment and well-documented cases 
of massacres” (Hughes 2007: 161). Putin’s promise to 
“waste them to the shithouse” was fulfilled, and offers an 
earthy description of one way that state violence can occur 
– military action decided by high-level state elites.
 Contemporary Russia gives us another example of state vi-
olence, but this time occurring at a lower analytical level. 
Mikhail Beketov, editor of a local newspaper in Khimki, a 
suburb of Moscow, had written often about the corruption 
of local officials, and had been warned to stop. In spring, 
2008 he called for the resignation of the city’s leadership, 
and a few days later a bomb destroyed his car (Levy 2010). 
Shortly thereafter, he was attacked leaving his home. The 
beating was so savage that his leg and several fingers had to 
be amputated. Brain injuries were so severe that he can 
barely utter simple sentences to this day. Although police 
promised a thorough investigation, the case remains un-
solved. According to one observer:
These types of attacks or other means of intimidation, including 
aggressive efforts by prosecutors to shut down news media out-
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lets or nonprofit groups, serve as unnerving deterrents. And in a 
few cases, in recent years the violence in the country has escala-
ted into contract killings. Corruption is widespread in Russia, 
and government often functions poorly. But most journalists 
and nonprofit groups shy away from delving deeply into these 
problems. (Levy 2010, A4)
 
They shy away because violence by state agents is a palpable 
reality. Other reporters and editors have been beaten and/
or arrested on inflated charges. In the extreme, they have 
been murdered by contract killers. Anna Politkovskaya’s as-
sassination in 2006 is widely known, but there have been 
numerous others. One plausible estimate holds that over 
one hundred newspaper reporters and editors have been 
murdered since 2000 (Levy 2010).
 This article develops a rubric for analyzing state violence at 
various levels, and, similarly, the various dimensions by 
which political opposition is organized. It offers pre-
liminary rumination on the richness and diversity of 
political oppositions that builds on a small literature on 
“micromobilization” and “dissident networks” (Opp and 
Roehl 1990; Opp and Gern 1993; Johnston 2005) and, 
similarly, on a literature on the states’ multileveled efforts 
at social control (Ferree 2005; White and White 1995; Car-
ley 1997). It offers, in part, a contrast to approaches that 
see the protest mobilization-repression nexus as more or 
less straightforward reflections of costs, benefits, oppor-
tunities and thresholds for action. Approaching this goal 
from a broad comparative perspective of several different 
authoritarian states, I focus on three dimensions relevant 
to levels and forms of state violence: (1) the complexity of 
state’s apparatus of repression and control and how dif-
ferent levels exercise variable forms of violence against ac-
tivists, either to shut down protests or to prevent them 
from materializing through fear and intimidation; (2) the 
creativity of the opposition’s actions to voice its demands 
and avoid repression and surveillance; and (3) the recursive 
and iterative relationship between the two, a dark dance 
between state and opposition with high stakes for both.
 First, regarding the state, I argue that its repressive violence 
is best conceptualized according to a hierarchy of repressive 
administration. This includes, not just national-level mili-
tary or security-force repression, as in Chechen case, or in 
Syria throughout 2011 and 2012, but also personal-level 
thuggery against reporters, dissidents, and vocal citizens, as 
in the Russian example, or as commonly reported by Egyp-
tian activists before Murbarak’s fall, or today, by Chinese ac-
tivists regularly. Additionally, I will specify a middle-range 
of state violence at the provincial level by party officials and 
administrators, by police and private militias, and by vari-
ous other security organs. A further factor in the adminis-
tration of social control is that at each of these levels, there 
are competing elite interests, which can create openings and 
even hidden allies for the opposition. While theorists of the 
modern bureaucratic state will find these observations 
about administrative levels noncontroversial, this article 
makes an original contribution by applying it to questions 
of social control and mobilization. State repression, is not a 
monolithic affair captured wholly by aggregate measures of 
police budgets, size of security apparatus, or protester 
deaths and injuries, but rather can be fruitfully analyzed 
both hierarchically at different levels and laterally, across 
these levels, where elite interests frequently diverge. Inter-
sections and gaps on both axes can create lapses in social 
control and openings for the opposition.
The second dimension focuses on the opposition and how 
it takes advantage of these complexities of repressive ad-
ministration. I will discuss the practicalities of social con-
trol in a particular kind of repressive state, high-capacity 
authoritarian regimes (or HCAs), and how it can never be 
complete precisely because of the scope and complexity of 
state administration. This creates free spaces for the politi-
cal opposition that similarly occur at national, regional, 
and local levels. These free spaces are forums of speech 
and innovative action that give rise to novel ways to keep 
oppositional sentiments in the public forum. Rather than 
visions of crushing totalitarian fear and preference falsifi-
cation (Kuran 1992), I will discuss the wellsprings of free-
dom and creativity that sometimes exist in modern 
authoritarian states. These “weapons of the weak” were 
chronicled by James Scott (1985, 1990), in his ground-
breaking research on peasant societies. This article makes 
an original contribution by identifying several forms they 
take in modern HCAs (high-capacity authoritarianisms) 
to circumvent repression and keep oppositional senti-
ments alive.
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 The third focus combines the first two, following Tilly’s call 
(2003) to understand collective violence in dynamic terms. 
I highlight how state violence occurs in an ongoing and re-
cursive relationship with the opposition at the different le-
vels of its organization. I conclude by suggesting that mid- 
and microlevels of social organization both of the opposi-
tion and the state – often overlooked by quantitative 
studies of the mobilization-repression nexus – play key 
roles in state-oppositional dynamics. I have in mind (1) 
how the diversity of social control apparatus means that 
the opposition sometimes finds occasional allies within it; 
and (2) how the widespread official corruption that char-
acterizes these regimes at all levels is especially relevant at 
the local level. In general, I suggest that the gap between of-
ficial ideology and the corruption that permeates HCAs 
animates the opposition through resentment and anger at 
hundreds of daily insults in the arena of daily life. As news, 
not only of daily injustices but also acts of protest and re-
sistance, diffuse by word of mouth preference falsification 
and fear are mitigated, keeping alive oppositional senti-
ments in public opinion. The complexity of HCAs means 
that citizens are not completely quiescent, but rather they 
are very careful who they talk to.
 This article takes a first step in thinking systematically 
about how this multileveled complexity affects the rela-
tionship between state repression and oppositional mobi-
lization. It offers a framework for a more fine-grained 
analysis of state violence and its causes. Mark Lichbach 
once lamented, “Why have scholars theorized and reported 
that all possible curves fit the impact of repression on dis-
sent?” (1987, 293). This article will show that part of the 
answer lies, on the one hand, in missing the complexity of 
repressive apparatus and, on the other, a failure to appre-
hend the creativity of the opposition. The article offers sev-
eral propositions to serve as benchmarks for analysts of a 
more midlevel orientation to state violence, and concludes 
by suggesting how recognition of these gaps in theory 
might affect how researchers model the mobilization-re-
pression relationship in the future.
1. State Violence and Mobilization
Research on state violence and protest mobilization has 
failed to produce a general model that consistently fits the 
variety of trajectories and outcomes. Early research sug-
gested a point in the application of state violence beyond 
which citizen frustration and aggression erupts, an implicit 
point of proportionality where repression begins to incite 
protest rather than quell it (Davies 1969; Feierabend and 
Feierabend 1962; Gurr 1970). Before that point, increasing 
repression tends to have a negative effect on protest levels 
because it raises the costs of participation. After that point, 
backlash occurs against the brutality of the regime’s re-
sponse. This is a model that is more applicable to auth-
oritarian states and non-democracies because it presumes 
the state’s willingness to escalate violence as needed, with-
out concern for legality or human rights. For a repressive 
regime, knowing where this point lies is important because 
it informs “the dictator’s dilemma” (Francisco 2005), the 
question of how much repression is necessary to quell dis-
sent without provoking reactive backlash – a dilemma 
faced by the al-Assad regime in Syria 2012.
Subsequent research provided evidence for a completely 
opposite relationship, namely, that low levels of state viol-
ence are linked with political opportunities that mitigate 
protest mobilization. This is a model more appropriate to 
relatively open and democratic regimes. In this view, low 
repression corresponds with the availability of institutional 
channels for claim-making, which alleviate the need for 
extrainstitutional protest. As repression increases, in-
stitutional opportunities close and protest increases, but 
here too, only up to a threshold, which marks the point at 
which costs become too high. A line of deterrence is cross-
ed, after which state violence increasingly inhibits protest 
mobilization. Several studies support the operation of a 
line of deterrence, not only in open political regimes but 
also where state violence was increasing: in France and 
England (Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975), Northern Ireland 
(White and White 1995), South Africa (Olivier 1991), and 
Germany (Opp and Roehl 1990).
One reason for these inconsistent findings is that studies 
often combine different types of state regime, which is why 
this article focuses on HCAs only. Another reason is that 
aggregate measures of state violence are more reflective of 
system characteristics such as police expenditures or size of 
the armed forces than of the various forms of state violence 
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(Koopmans 1997, 152–53), which is why this article ex-
plores middle-range and microlevel data to make com-
parisons among state actions. Several scholars argue that it 
is not only the intensity but also the form of repression 
that affects mobilization, and it is plausible that the same 
goes for the form of oppositional actions. Opp and Roehl 
(1990) differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate 
protest, with the defining criteria resting on tactics and 
legality. White and White (1995) point out that, even in 
Western democracies, it is incorrect to assume that all re-
pression occurs within legal parameters. They trace “infor-
mal” repression in Northern Ireland that is typically 
carried out by rogue individuals or circles within the po-
lice. In the United States, Carley (1995) draws upon gov-
ernment records about the American Indian Movement to 
trace covert repression.
But also, there is the view that the repression-protest rela-
tionship embraces too many variables, too much dynamic 
monitoring of opponents, and too complex temporal and 
spatial variations to be captured by a single model. Rasler 
(1996) and Kurzman (1996) both point out that the mere 
perception of an opportunity – one that may not objec-
tively exist – can spur action, demand sacrifices, encourage 
small victories, and thereby create new openings. Groups 
can be dispersed spatially (Rasler 1996) and they can 
cluster by risk-taking orientation (Karklins and Peterson 
1993). Similarly, the opposition has a repertoire of protest 
actions, between violence and nonviolence (Lichbach 1987; 
Moore 1998), between direct and indirect action, between 
overt protest and unobtrusive actions.
Because a great deal of research about the repression-
mobilization relationship relies on modeling of aggregate 
data, it misses much of the “cultural work” of resistance 
and opposition (Scott 1985, 1990; Melucci 1985, 1989). Re-
search in the field of social movements has long recognized 
the importance of behind-the-scenes activities in move-
ment development: Morris identifies “movement halfway 
houses” in the U.S. civil rights movement (1982), Mueller 
refers to “cultural laboratories” in the women’s movement 
(1994), and Fantasia and Hirsch discuss “spatial preserves” 
in Islamist movements (1995). The more widely used con-
cept in this literature is free spaces, which describes gather-
ing places outside direct surveillance of the state where new 
ideas can be voiced and put into practice (Polletta 1999). 
These are safe havens that mitigate the costs of par-
ticipation and offer subtle and satisfying selective incen-
tives to participants. As I will suggest, it is in the cracks of 
civil life created by the complex organization of HCAs 
where free spaces can flourish.
2. State Capacity and Violence
Regarding variations in state regimes, scholars have classi-
fied repressive states on various dimensions, the most im-
portant being the extent of state capacity, size of repressive 
apparatus, and legitimacy – or lack thereof. At the pole of 
extreme repressiveness, totalitarian states (such as North 
Korea, Belarus, and Tajikstan) are characterized by ongoing 
monitoring and social control through a highly developed 
police apparatus, strong ideological socialization, and con-
tinual ideological propagandizing. These are tasks that 
require an extensive mobilization capacity and continual 
internal monitoring of both state institutions and daily so-
cial life. Such resource-intensive tasks are characteristic of 
high levels of state capacity. More common are extremely 
repressive states that have lower capacity, sometimes la-
beled sultanistic regimes, a term introduced by Max Weber 
(1968), and elaborated by Linz and Stepan (1996; see also 
Linz and Cheabi 1998). These regimes rest on the auto-
cratic rule of a supreme leader. They are dictatorships 
based on plunder and personalism, which are common in 
less developed states. State administration is concentrated 
in a small circle dependent on the supreme leader’s benefi-
cence. The forces of social control are his instruments of 
rule and enrichment, as was the case in Nicaragua under 
Somoza, Iran under the Shah Pahlavi, Romania under 
Ceausescu, or Uganda under Amin.
Authoritarian states tend to navigate a course between 
these two extremes. They offer more areas of freedom to 
their citizens and tend to be quite stable because they enjoy 
greater legitimacy. In contrast to Linz’s early character -
ization of authoritarian states as having limited capacity 
and an underdeveloped state ideology (1964), it is fair to 
say that a more common contemporary pattern is extensive 
state development and greater degrees of legitimacy, for 
example, in one-party authoritarian states such as Mexico 
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before 1996, Argentina in the 1960s, or Venezuela today. 
There may actually be a modicum of political pluralism 
either in the form of permitted dissent (within bounds) 
among ruling party members or the existence of window-
dressing parties with a handful of seats in rubber-stamp 
legislatures. One-party authoritarianisms use local party 
and union leaders who deliver the vote by distributing fa-
vors to the grassroots – especially employment – in return 
for support. These kinds of authoritarian states tend to be 
more stable than military authoritarianisms (Geddes 
1999). Pluralism may be reflected in differences of opinion 
within bureaucratic agencies, for example when leaders rely 
on economic experts to guide modernization policies 
(O’Donnell 1973). Pluralism may also play a limited role in 
institutional development outside the state, such as the 
Catholic Church in communist Poland or in Francoist 
Spain. In these cases, the authoritarian state was unable to 
completely co-opt the church because of strong public 
opinion, and thus local churches became free spaces, 
mostly outside state control.
 In this article I focus on high-capacity authoritarian re-
gimes (HCAs), such as China, Russia, Iran, Mexico before 
democratization, and Egypt before the fall of Mubarak. 
Among the states that I will discuss, the degree of state ca-
pacity will vary, but only slightly, and will be noted when 
its effects are significant. The state capacity of China and 
Russia is very great, but it is lower in Syria, for example, 
where elements of state administration reflect more sult-
anistic and/or personalistic patterns based on family, tribal, 
and communal ties.
 Many aspects of HCAs are well known. Those that are most 
relevant to my analysis can be summarized as follows:
1. One-party rule. Meaningful political participation is li-
mited to one party. If present, opposition parties are 
more a symbolic gesture to a façade of democracy than 
any substantive reflection of competing interests. In 
Egypt, for example, support for “opposition parties” 
paled in contrast to the ruling National Democratic 
Party, which gained 88 percent of the vote in November 
2010. Façade parties, such as the Wafd Party, the Leftist 
Unionist Party, and the Arab-Nasserite Party, among 
others, divided the remaining seats between them. The 
largest opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood, was illegal 
and outside the electoral process, although its candi-
dates ran as independents. There is a sense that 
members of these opposition parties are complicit in 
authoritarian rule, yet when the opposition mobilizes, 
they often play key roles.
2. Centralization of governance. One dimension of this sec-
ond characteristic flows from the first, namely, that 
party structure is often blurred or overlaps with state 
administrative functions. A second dimension is that 
legislative and judicial functions are subordinated to the 
executive institutions of the one-party state. The on-
going erosion of the independent judiciary in Venezuela 
by placing members of Chavez’s Bolivarian Party in re-
gional and local judgeships is an example. Regarding the 
military, its degree of independence varies according to 
different historical and regional contexts. In some states 
there may be a strong overlap with party membership, 
as has occurred in Venezuela too, as a result of con-
scious policy by Chavez to ensure the loyalty of com-
manders. In Egypt, the military maintained a degree of 
independence through geopolitical ties with the U.S. 
and through its involvement in profit-making enter-
prises. Recent regime changes in Egypt and Tunisia 
demonstrate how destabilizing military independence 
from state and party can be.
3. Media control. HCAs seek to limit and control those in-
stitutions that govern the flow of information to 
citizens. Ministries of information and propaganda 
manage the complex task of censoring news and com-
mentary, but, as I will discuss, the effectiveness of their 
efforts is often a casualty of state administrative com-
plexity because newspapers and broadcast media are 
often local or regional, and therefore harder to control.
4. Highly developed social control apparatus. Numerous le-
vels of police organization are common: a national, 
state, and local police, state security forces, secret police, 
networks of spies, special militias, and party enforcers. 
These forces are distinct from the military as loci of the 
means of violence in the authoritarian state, but the 
military too is often divided into special units, elite divi-
sions, and republican guards chosen for loyalty to the 
president. Finally, bands of thugs – often policemen and 
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party members known for their brutality, physical in-
timidation, and violent efficiency – work as agents of 
enforcement and fear, especially during states of emerg-
ency. It may be that they are organized more formally 
into militias or vigilante groups to do the bidding of 
economic and political elites ex jure.
5. Absence of citizen protections. The logical extension of a 
highly developed police apparatus is the arbitrary use of 
police powers. Surveillance, extrajudicial detentions, ca-
priciousness of enforcement, shakedowns, bribes, and 
protection rackets are all common. Detentions, beat-
ings, harassment, incommunicado periods, torture, and, 
in the extreme, disappearances, create fear among 
family and loved ones that ripples through society. They 
also drive the accumulation of collective grievances and 
limit public forms of collective action – but encourage 
unobtrusive forms among certain sectors of the public, 
as I will discuss.
6. Political venality. More so than in democracies, there are 
huge benefits at the upper echelons of authoritarian 
states for economic and political elites who cooperate 
with the state and ruling party. For those who are will-
ing to play the game within the rules of one-party con-
trol and forfeit principles of liberal democratic 
governance, self-interest is a powerful stabilizing factor 
at society’s upper levels of status and wealth, which 
mitigates division among elites. At the lower levels of re-
gion, province, town, and municipality, the same logic is 
at work on a smaller scale, creating opportunities for 
sweetheart contracts, bribery, theft, real estate deals, and 
shakedowns that impart a strong interest in the status 
quo among local elites, and strong resentments among 
the public, for whom the injustices of such schemes do 
not go unnoticed.
7. Clientalism. The distribution of jobs, contracts, favors for 
family members, and the social capital of connections 
and status also become powerful tools for mitigating 
political opposition. At the lower levels of state authority, 
many citizens find employment in the state-controlled 
sectors of the economy (state-owned industries), ad-
ministration (the various functions of the high-capacity 
state, such as health, education, welfare), and social con-
trol apparatus (police and army). This creates a large 
pool of citizens whose interests either lie with the status 
quo or are complicated by various pulls and pressures in 
different directions regarding political opposition.
3. Elite Divisions: Spaces for Corruption and Resistance
Research has long recognized that division among ruling 
elites is a key factor in regime instability. To counter these 
forces, HCAs offer strong economic incentives of self-
enrichment and enrichment of family members, both im-
mediate and extended. In the absence of threats to the 
status quo, HCAs manage elite conflicts with the carrot of 
economic benefits and the stick of party discipline. For es-
pecially egregious behaviors there is the threat of expulsion 
and arrest. That such divisions occur frequently is noncon-
troversial among analysts, and is revealed especially in 
times of regime instability and change, such as in Tunisia 
in early 2011.
In January, 2011, Tunisian state and party leaders 
scrambled to distance themselves from the authoritarian 
rule of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in order to secure positions 
in the new regime after huge popular protests forced him 
to flee. Mohamed Ghanouchi was Ben Ali’s right-hand 
man under the old regime. Despite challenges, Ghanouchi 
was able to portray himself as a competent administrator 
and technocrat and form a transitional cabinet. Other old-
regime insiders were not so successful, and were quickly ex-
pelled from the transitional government in response to 
popular protests. Mouldi Jendoubi, the second-in-com-
mand of the Tunisian Trade Union, was at the forefront of 
calls for further expulsions, even though he and other 
union leaders both acquiesced to and benefited from their 
relationships with the Ben Ali government. Their call for a 
general strike to expunge party insiders from the new cabi-
net helped establish their credentials of oppositional mili-
tancy. These kinds of elite divisions are well-documented 
mechanisms of opening opportunities for mobilization of 
political oppositions (see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 
2001). Polarization of elites is a fundamental criterion for 
the development of revolutionary situations (Goodwin 
2002). While sometimes studied regarding the im-
plementation and outcomes of protest (Amenta and 
Zyman 1991; Amenta and Young 1999), elite divisions at 
regional and local levels should also be considered in the 
repression-mobilization nexus.
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As among national elites, competition and disagreement 
occur frequently among regional and local administrators 
too, both laterally and vertically. These divisions, both real 
and potential, are important for two reasons when analyz-
ing state violence. First they create maneuvering room for 
elites at various levels to enhance their power and pursue 
self-enrichment, corruption, intimidation, and thuggery. 
Second, they also provide room for free spaces in which the 
developing opposition can take advantages of lapses in so-
cial control and enforcement, and play upon conflicting 
elite interests to recruit allies. Although elite analysis at the 
national level often takes precedence in the political and 
social sciences – and remains crucial in analyzing political 
instability and regime change – lapses of enforcement and 
shifting alliances at less exalted levels also can have far-
reaching consequences, both for the developing opposition 
and for the “prevailing strategies” of social control (Koop-
mans and Kriesi 1995).
 A key focus in this article is that the local level is where 
thousands of functionaries draw upon state and/or party 
authority to augment their meager salaries. Just as the 
upper echelons of power enrich themselves through land 
deals, state contracts, and joint ventures, so too do local in-
spectors, municipal employees, policemen, party leaders, 
union officials, and low-level bureaucrats, among others, 
take petty bribes, shakedown street vendors and local busi-
nessmen, and pursue their own interests. The protests that 
brought down the regime in Tunisia were precipitated pre-
cisely at this level, when a municipal inspector tried to con-
fiscate the fruit from Mohamed Bouazizi’s street-vending 
cart in the city of Sidi Bouzid. Itinerant vendors were com-
monly harassed by police and inspectors, with the under-
standing that they either pay a bribe of ten dinars (five 
euros, or several days’ wages), or run away and lose their 
cart and stock (Fahim 2011). On December 17, 2010, 
Bouazizi stood firm and was beaten by inspectors. His self-
immolation in protest precipitated the mass mobilizations 
that toppled the Ben Ali regime.
It is typical of HCAs that claims and grievances about state 
corruption accumulate nationally, regionally, and – perhaps 
most importantly – locally. Most citizens, for most of the 
time, experience the state at this level. And because of this, 
the enrichissez-vous machinations of party elites in the capi-
tal, although far removed from quotidian experience, are 
often talked about and are well known as examples of il-
legitimate and unjust governance. As a normal and ex-
pected part of daily existence, authoritarian corruption 
rides on the complex division of labor of HCAs. When 
examining the varieties of state violence, these small injus-
tices must be considered along with mobilization of the 
military or deployment of the riot police. Yet, just as the de-
centralization of social control in HCAs permits these small 
acts of violence, so too does it create interstices where the 
opposition can take shape and grow in the form of free 
spaces, again, especially at the local level.
These observations lead to three basic propositions about 
HCAs, which will guide the discussion that follows:
Propostion 1. Oppositional ubiquity. HCAs contain intrinsic 
spaces where opposition can develop, derived from the com-
plexity of the social control task.
Proposition 2. Oppositional creativity. The creativity of cer-
tain activists in HCAs can produce intrinsic spaces for the op-
position that reduce the associated risks.
Proposition 3. Oppositional motivation. The political venality 
of HCAs fuels oppositional sentiments and drives the creativ-
ity and ubiquity of actions embodied in the first two proposi-
tions. Corruption at the local level is especially important for 
fueling regime illegitimacy in the long term.
4. Opposition in HCAs: Unobtrusive and Ubiquitous
A large body of research about political and social move-
ments has firmly established that large mobilizations do 
not emerge full-grown from the head of Zeus, but rather 
come from preexisting mobilizing structures that serve as 
the basis of organization (McCarthy and Zald 1977; 
 McAdam 1982, 1999; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996; 
Tarrow 1998). Most of these studies examine democratic 
regimes, but cracks and lapses in the repressive apparatus 
of HCAs suggest similar preorganization of grievance ar-
ticulation. For example, during the summer of 2011 as 
 Syrians confronted the al-Assad regime, their actions were 
guided by local coordinating committees in all the major 
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cities. Where did these groups spontaneously come from if 
everyone had been living in quiescence among their 
neighbors (Arsu and Stack 2011)? It is more likely that 
they grew out of hidden networks of opposition, often 
with ties with émigré activists, but primarily organized 
and maintained within the small free spaces of the 
 repressive state.
My own field research in authoritarian states found that in 
the Soviet Union, in Poland, in Mexico, and in Francoist 
Spain, subterranean organizations of opposition, politi-
cized in varying degrees, commonly existed– indeed, were 
permitted to exist – in the interstices of state administrative 
complexity (Johnston 2005, 2006, 2011; Johnston and 
Mueller 2001; Johnston and Taverna 2012). This principle 
strongly parallels Scott’s classic analyses of repressive social 
relations in traditional societies (1985, 1990). The existence 
of informal, sometimes duplicitous oppositional groups 
and organizations offers an alternative explanation for the 
rapid mobilizations of “popular fronts” against the com-
munist Eastern Europe regimes. Rather than years of pent-
up frustration and preference falsification being unleashed 
by external events, mass mobilizations grew out of pre-
existing networks among discontented citizens, who regu-
larly discussed – albeit carefully – how they were fed up 
with the contradictions of “mature socialism,” with the 
deficits of citizen freedom, with the small injustices of 
everyday life, and the inequities of communist party domi-
nance.
In truth, HCAs never completely stamp out the opposition 
(the key point of proposition one above). Nor are HCA 
states single-actor monoliths with their agents marching in 
lock-step to enforce social control. I base these observa-
tions on several projects (Johnston 2005, 2006, 2011), 
whose findings can be summarized by the following obser-
vations: (1) Varieties of oppositional talk persist and are in-
deed quite common among particular networks of people 
– a finding that strongly contrasts the observation that 
“preference falsification” leads to political quiescence in re-
pressive regimes (Kuran 1992). (2) Talk is frequently or-
ganized in groups and organizations that often function 
duplicitously, being public and often officially recognized, 
but surreptitiously maintaining an oppositional ambiance 
among members. Creative actors carve out free spaces 
where they can take advantage of lapses in state surveil-
lance, call upon new allies within the state, and innovate 
new tactics of opposition. (3) These networks of opposi-
tionists – who vary in the risks they are willing to take – 
 include outspoken dissidents and the members of their 
circles, especially among writers and artists, as well as ordi-
nary citizens who resist the lack of freedom and react with 
repugnance against official corruption. (4) These groups 
and networks put pressure on the regime to democratize 
and are also springboards of yet more forceful and open 
oppositional activities once the regime takes steps to re-
form. (5) It is common for the free spaces these groups 
carve out to exist in part through the complicity of state 
agents who look the other way, or police who warn a sus-
pect rather than detaining him or her, or party officials 
who choose not to report oppositional activities among 
friends. In some cases, these state agents may privately har-
bor oppositional sentiments.
We can see the ubiquity of oppositional talk even in states 
like North Korea, probably the closest example of a totali-
tarian state we have today. Despite intense cradle-to-grave 
political indoctrination, media manipulation and mis-
information, widespread fear, xenophobic nationalism, Or-
wellian public discourse, and staged personality-cult 
rituals, many North Koreans can still sift through the lies to 
interpret self-interest. In late 2009 protests erupted when 
the North Korean state announced a shock currency de-
valuation that wiped out the life savings of many citizens 
(McNeil 2009; Demick 2010). People protested in the 
streets of the capital, Pyongyang, and in rural towns and 
villages (Li-Sun 2009), some setting fire to piles of now-
worthless old currency. Moreover, such protests are not 
new. There were reports of protests by women against age 
prohibitions for participation in local markets four years 
ago. I have been told of jokes about Kim Il-Sung’s hairdo. 
When Soviet archives were opened to researchers, it be-
came clear that the Stalinist terror was not monolithic 
(Priestland 2007). Orders from Moscow were sometimes 
ignored in the distant republics. Aspects of Stalin’s person-
ality cult were not accepted, and sometimes even mocked. 
Some cases of low-level political dissent were identified 
(Viola 2003).
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Recognizing that cracks in the repressive apparatus allow 
oppositional talk to occur and groups to exist is a finding 
with important implications for the mobilization-
 repression nexus. Just as there are undercurrents of conflict 
among political elites at different levels of administration, 
so too are there undercurrents of opposition, but here 
mostly at the local, quotidian level of life. Moreover, not 
only do cracks and hiatuses in the repressive apparatus 
allow activists to seize and construct free spaces, but covert 
oppositional attitudes among elites may create oppor-
tunities. As one former Soviet censor reported to me, when 
his bosses were on vacation he could let things pass. Some-
times it was friendship that made censors look the other 
way – when they could get away with it. Other times, free 
spaces existed because of the ineptitude or laziness of the 
security forces. Activists reported leniency by the police be-
cause the opposition’s existence, to some extent, defined 
the police role and gave them something to do. As such, the 
game was afoot. More generally, this perspective suggests 
that the prevailing strategy of an authoritarian state is at 
least partly defined by its recognition of these free spaces.
Proposition 4. Free-space oppositions sometimes have low-
level allies within HCA regimes, either intentionally through 
the actions of covert supporters, or unintentionally through 
laziness or ineptitude of regime personnel. Although not nu-
merous, the impact of these “inside connections” is dispropor-
tionate to their number because they help oppositional 
sentiments to remain in public consciousness during periods 
of apparent quiescence.
5. The Scope and Form of Free Spaces
Many of the groups and organizations that constitute op-
position movements in HCAs are informally organized, less 
overtly political in focus, and their actions often un-
obtrusive. However, other groups may be less surreptitious 
and more formally organized, such as façade parties, which 
are recognized and permitted to exist within limits to con-
vey the impression of political pluralism. One example lo-
cated towards the organized pole is the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which by a decision as the national level op-
erated under a modus vivendi with the Mubarak regime. 
The Brotherhood officially eschewed oppositional politics 
and cultivated its free spaces in grassroots organization of a 
social, charitable, and religious character. As long as it oper-
ated within these constraints it was able to avoid direct sup-
pression, although it was technically an illegal organization. 
The Brotherhood had to practice careful political restraint 
in arenas of civic discourse as a precondition of the free 
spaces it enjoyed. For the regime, the risks of such a strat-
egy are that its security forces appear weak to the public be-
cause of the persistent and apparent contradiction between 
what it says (the Brotherhood is an illegal, radical Islamist 
organization) and what it does (turn the other way in the 
interests of placating the 20 percent of the population that 
support the organization). Another risk is that the organiz-
ation becomes a springboard for mobilization against the 
regime should the context of opportunities and constraints 
change. It is interesting that thirty years ago a similar strat-
egy was exercised by the communist regime in Poland re-
garding the Catholic Church, which was at the forefront of 
early Solidarity mobilization. Unlike the Church, the 
Brotherhood was slow to participate in the gathering op-
position in early 2011, and stayed away from street protests, 
a position that it could not sustain as momentum grew.
Variability in state repression is also evident in China if we 
compare the violent campaign against Falun Gong several 
years ago with the blind-eye tolerance of house-church 
Christianity (Vala and O’Brien 2007). Somewhere between 
Beijing’s halls of power and enforcement by local party 
cadres, one religious movement (Falun Gong, which seems 
to be supremely apolitical) is more heavily repressed, while 
the other, evangelical Christianity, encounters semi-toler-
ance in some locales (Vala and O’Brien 2007). Although 
both are prohibited by the letter of the law, it seems that 
many provincial officials see nonofficial Christianity as less 
threatening than the vague spiritualism of Falun Gong. The 
apparent contradiction of one being labeled a superstitious 
throwback to pre-communist China and the other not 
demonstrates the variability of enforcement at national 
and local levels. Where national direction is less clear, en-
forcement risks mitigation by different perceptions of po-
tential threat and local interests, in this case, by lower-level 
bureaucrats in the state and party apparatus. Not only does 
the complexity of the state often lead to variable ap-
plication of repression, but complexity of perception and 
interests, say, if a person’s parents are secret Christians, 
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compounds it. Finally, there is also the issue of the how a 
particular policy sphere, in this case state control of relig-
ious practice, is related to political opposition. Permitting 
house-church worship by several dozen citizens is much 
less threatening than, say, the organization of ethnic politi-
cal organizations in the Tibetan, Uyghur, and Mongolian 
regions that challenge the territorial integrity of the state.
Prior to 2011, when protest tolerance decreased significant -
ly in the wake of the Arab Spring, this kind of selective re-
pression characterized China’s prevailing strategy. After the 
2008 earthquake in Sichuan Province, which caused many 
deaths among young children because of shoddy school 
construction, a diverse and diffuse movement among 
 parents mobilized to demand compensation and account -
ability of local officials. In addition to the participants’ tra-
gedy of personal loss, many local party officials had 
profited from building contracts where shortcuts and sub-
standard materials were used, deepening perceptions of in-
justice and lack of accountability. Provincial officials 
allowed many of these protests to proceed, reflecting in 
part the need to appear responsive to citizens’ demands 
(and the “Olympics thaw”) – as long as they remain iso-
lated, specific, local, and did not challenge dominant politi-
cal alignments of state and party. Activists that passed these 
thresholds were often beaten and arrested.
Proposition 5. Because perceived threat determines repressive le-
vels, there will be variability according to policy areas and claims 
of protests. Repression can also vary by administrative level of 
enforcement, creating temporary free spaces for movements.
Proposition five also applies to media control and limi-
tations on press freedoms, which in China are both heavy 
and pervasive, but not hermetically sealed. On the one 
hand, news of political turmoil is routinely repressed. Riots 
in Lhasa or Urumqui find no space in Chinese dailies. The 
Ministry of Propaganda sends out weekly lists of stories 
that cannot be covered in print and broadcast media. Dur-
ing the 2011 popular mobilizations in Egypt, newspapers, 
broadcast media, and internet in China were mute on the 
subject (Wong and Barbosa 2011). On the other hand, the 
complexity of social control means that censorship some-
times fails simply because of ineptitude. To take one 
example, a classified advertisement appearing in the 
Chengdu Evening News paid homage to the mothers who 
lost children in the Tiananmen Square massacre. The 
meaning of the ad slipped by the staff: “Saluting the strong 
mothers of victims of 64” was its cryptic text. Six-four is 
common shorthand for the repression on June 4 (6-4), 
1989, when hundreds – perhaps thousands of students 
were killed by the People’s Liberation Army. The ad-
vertisement referred to those few mothers who, despite an 
absolute ban on speaking of the massacre, have continued 
to call for an investigation. It seems that the young woman 
who accepted the ad was unaware of the significance of the 
“64” reference, and was told it was the date of a mining dis-
aster when she asked the person placing the ad. News of the 
defiant ad went viral on the internet before censors were 
able to intervene. The Ministry of Propaganda had the final 
word, however, because three editors at the newspaper were 
fired in retaliation.
As in other aspects of society, members of the media may 
sometimes intentionally push the limits of tolerance. There 
are always a few reporters and editors who are willing to 
see how far they can go in pursuit of journalistic freedom. 
In June 2010, Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolis 
Daily), a paper in the Pearl River Delta region known for 
its provocative editorials and investigative journalism, pub-
lished a cartoon that also made veiled references the Tian-
anmen Square massacre. In one of several cartoons 
commemorating International Children’s Day on June 1, a 
blackboard image drawn by a child depicts a lone figure 
standing in front of a line of tanks. The drawing echoes the 
famous news video from 1989, in which a sole student pro-
tester attempts to block the advance of tanks towards the 
square (see Figure 1). The cartoon was removed after the 
image began to circulate online with comments about the 
Tiananmen Square events. The torch in the upper left of 
the chalkboard replicates the one held by the iconic God-
dess of Democracy at the Tiananmen demonstrations (the 
other notations also are indirect references to the student 
movement, see Earp 2010). The point is that, like the news 
blackout of anti-Mubarak protests, the regime attempted to 
strictly enforce silence about the events surrounding the 
Tiananmen Square protests, but cracks in the system occur 
for numerous reasons. It is not plausible that editors could 
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have carelessly missed these references; rather they seemed 
to be testing the limits of what could pass.
keeping the hope of political opposition alive among a 
populace that is frequently outraged at the small injustices 
encountered every day. Rather than preference falsification, 
the analyst might speak of the “hope confirmation” that 
these microlevel acts accomplish for segments of the popu-
lation.
Proposition 6. The effect of free-space acts of opposition is 
two-fold: creating a base for the social organization of opposi-
tional movement, and breaking the social-psychological con-
straints of silence and preference falsification. This second 
effect broadens awareness of others who share oppositional 
sentiments, and creates a potential pool of actors poised to 
participate once mobilization efforts begin.
6. The Heterogeneity of State Violence
Max Weber observed that the state maintains a monopoly 
on the legitimate exercise of violence. Mao Tse-tung ad-
vised his cadres that all power flows from the barrel of a 
gun. It should come as no surprise as we consider the ex-
ercise of state power that the state uses violence against its 
citizenry much more frequently than the other way 
around. The sheer firepower and destructive reach of the 
modern state are overwhelming compared to what citizens 
have at their disposal. Yet HCAs are also typified by a com-
plex division of labor in the business of violence among the 
military, security forces, special units known for their 
fierceness and/or loyalty, secret police, local police, vigi-
lantes and militias, and, finally, thugs and enforcers who do 
the bidding of local elites and strongmen. Activists in Syria 
report that there are no less than sixteen distinct branches 
of security apparatus operating in major cities. Thus, the 
complex division of labor in HCAs extends to agents of 
state violence, and carries with it significant consequences 
regarding state violence and free spaces. My goals in this 
final section are to show (1) how these various levels are 
analytically discrete in the application of violence; and (2) 
how, even here, the recursive relationship between the state 
and opposition exerts its influence in the course of events, 
especially at microlevels, to create spaces for opposition.
6.1 The Military and Ethnic-Communal Heterogeneity
The highest, most institutionally established, and geo-
graphically most extensive level of analysis is the national 
Figure 1: “Commemorating Children’s Day” at Tiananmen Square
 Source: http://chinaview.wordpress.com/2010/06/03/
These examples provide good characterizations of the rela-
tionship between state and opposition at local levels of the 
authoritarian state. We perhaps see it reported more fre-
quently in relation to press freedoms because Western re-
porters in China, Iran, Russia, and elsewhere, are especially 
attuned to these. But the general conclusions are that small 
openings and cracks occur (1) because of the heroism of 
particular actors, such as reporter Shi Tao, who was sen-
tenced to a ten-year prison term for e-mailing to the West 
the Ministry of Propaganda’s directives about Tiananmen 
Square coverage. (2) Free spaces occur because of mistakes, 
ineptitude, complexity, and the sheer extent of the task of 
implementing total control. (3) They also are carved out 
through the complicity of certain agents who, as minor acts 
of rebellion against quiescence and pervasive control, let 
prohibited material pass. (4) They occur because of the in-
herent creativity of activists who find ways to evade re-
strictions that the authorities never contemplated (for 
example, the fascinating case of Chinese internet phenom-
enon of the “grass mud horse” which recently went viral 
there (see Wines 2009). In all these cases, the effect is not so 
much giant strides in political opposition, but rather 
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military. Military elites are often highly integrated and in-
fluential in HCAs, as in China, Russia, Venezuela, Mexico, 
Egypt, and Tunisia. Cleavages between political and mili-
tary elites pose basic threats to regime stability, but it is 
typical that high-capacity states quell conflict through 
strong economic incentives for both political and military 
elites. When the interests of generals diverge from those of 
political leaders, however, history tells us that regime 
change often follows. Diverging interests at the elite level 
was a major element in recent events in Egypt, where press-
ure from the generals drove Mubarak and his National 
Democratic Party from power. The most plausible ex-
planation is that military leaders threw in their lot with the 
protesters as a means to preserve their extensive involve-
ment in private sector enterprises and ensure continuity of 
huge military budgets and massive foreign assistance, pri-
marily from the United States. Here, divergent interests 
worked in favor of regime change and tentative steps to-
ward liberalization. In contrast, the willingness of Chinese 
military leaders to unleash violent repression against stu-
dents’ democratic protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989 
suggest there was strong correspondence between the inter-
ests of the military and political elites. Paradoxically, this 
correspondence rested in part on similar reasons, heavy 
military involvement in state and joint-venture enterprises, 
with the difference being the smaller scope of popular pro-
test in China, which was confined to student mobilizations 
in Beijing and several other Chinese universities.
Proposition 7. The size and scope of popular unrest, the inde-
pendence of the military, and the interaction between the two 
in relation to threats to military interests are the key factors 
determining the military’s response to popular unrest.
Complicating the relationship between military and politi-
cal elites are communal divisions within state territories, 
which function as another major variable in levels of state 
violence. Communal identities – not only ethnic but also 
religious and tribal – divide many states, and, more often 
than not, can unite the national military command against 
separatist pressures that threaten territorial integrity of the 
state. In ethnically diverse states it is common for the 
dominance of the majority group to be maintained in the 
upper ranks of the military. When it is not, the con-
sequences can be far-reaching. In the former Soviet Union, 
for example, ethnic divisions in the military undermined 
orders to fire on separatist protesters in various ethnic re-
publics. In the Estonian SSR, Air Force General Djokar Du-
daev, a Chechen, refused orders to fire on protesters calling 
for independence at a critical juncture in the Soviet 
Union’s dissolution. Dudaev was schooled in nationalist 
separatism when he was assigned to the air force base in 
Tartu, Estonia, and went on to lead the separatist Chechen 
republic to independence in 1991, and into war with Russia 
in 1994.
In contrast, nationalist protests and anti-Han ethnic riots 
in the Tibetan and Xinjian Autonomous Regions, where 
separatist movements have mobilized, have been violently 
repressed by the Han-dominated military units. Ethnic ho-
mogeneity minimized the risk of division within the ranks. 
Because the defense of national territory is so basic to the 
military’s function, the state’s armed forces are frequently 
players in the violent suppression of separatist ethnic-
national protests. In some cases, no doubt because com-
munal identifications are strong and activate 
social-psychological responses of violence and retribution, 
the most extreme form of state violence – ethnic genocide 
– is typically perpetrated by ethnically unified army units. 
This was clearly seen in the opening narrative about the 
Russia-Chechen war and the extensive violence that Rus-
sian air force and army, motivated partially by ethnic 
stereotypes, perpetrated on Chechen civilians.
Proposition 8. State military violence is aggravated when eth-
nic and communal divisions overlap with oppositional protest 
mobilization. An ethnically homogeneous military command 
has less hesitation using violence against minority ethnic 
movements because attributions of difference mitigate em-
pathy and identification.
In Syria, sectarian rather than ethnic divisions operate in 
military organization. The regime of Bashir al-Assad is 
dominated by Alawite Muslims, a minority Shiite sect, and 
Alawites tend to prevail among the leadership of the army 
and security forces. Alawite-led units slaughtered ten thou-
sand people to put down protests in the Sunni city of 
Hama in 1982. Today, threatened by mounting opposition 
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led by the majority Sunnis and the social-psychological ef-
fects of communal identity, the Syrian army had at the 
time of writing killed over nine thousand protesters. More-
over, sectarian divisions in the lower ranks have under-
mined the effectiveness of military violence – more on this 
below.
6.2 Militias and Praetorian Guards
Militias mobilized at the regime’s behest are to be distin-
guished from the national army, navy, and air force. While 
militias may be heavily armed, a common pattern is that 
they are under the command of the ruling party or a small 
inner circle of political elites associated with the head of 
state. Special military units that are segregated from the 
national armed forces can also be grouped here too. I have 
in mind Presidential Guards, Republican Guards, and simi-
lar praetorian units that are directly answerable to the 
leader as insurance against military coups d’etat, as in the 
case of Moammar Kadafi’s Revolutionary Brigade. During 
the turmoil that swept through Libya in 2011, this sizeable 
force had units assigned to protect Kadafi against units that 
might prove less loyal. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad’s brother 
Maher, heads the Revolutionary Guard and the notorious 
Fourth Division, both based in Damascus. In general, elite 
forces are distinguished from regular troops by special pay, 
benefits, and equipment to ensure their loyalty.
Regarding the Libyan uprising, Kadafi’s regime had lower 
capacity compared to Egypt or China, and tended toward 
the sultanistic pole of repressive regimes. Importantly, this 
was reflected in the fragmentation of the central military 
command and widespread defections among military com-
manders when protests broke out and repression began. 
Apart from the regular Libyan army, which had about 
forty-five thousand troops prior to the rebellion, the Revol-
utionary Guards had about four thousand and the People’s 
Militia reserves about four thousand. Characteristically for 
sultanism, Kadafi’s policy was to make sure that com-
manders were continually rotated to prevent bonds of 
loyalty from building between officers and men. He also 
kept some units loyal to him by appointing sons or family 
members to command them, and supplying them better 
than other units, both in the quantity and quality of ar-
maments. The Khamis Brigade, commanded by one of 
 Kadafi’s sons, is reported to have received newer equip-
ment, such as the latest tanks and rocket launchers, while 
other units made do with aging and low-tech Soviet 
 armaments (Zucchino 2011). These policies led to the 
rapid split in the country when the uprising began, as nor-
mal units, many of which were based in the east, defected 
to the opposition and better-armed, praetorian units con-
centrated in Tripoli to protect the regime.
Proposition 9. Reliance by political elites on special military 
units is characteristic of lower capacity authoritarian regimes 
tending toward the sultanistic model. This heterogeneity in the 
control of violent resources disposes such regimes to civil war 
rather than political transitions sustained by mass protests.
 The division between the military and these special units 
and militias or elite security units also gives rise to spaces 
of opportunity for the opposition, and, as such is funda-
mental to the application of state violence. This was evi-
dent in Egypt when the army refused to fire on protesters, 
but security forces and hired thugs waded into protests on 
Friday, January 29, 2011. During the following two days, it 
was the army that stood between protesters and armed 
supporters of the regime. These events are examples of how 
elites commonly rely on special units to ensure repressive 
capacity. In Iran, the Basij Militia and Revolutionary 
Guards, not the military, played a key role in the sup-
pression of the democratic movement in 2009 and recently 
in February 2011, (Worth and Fahti 2009). Various observ-
ers have reported to me that the regime of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad chooses not to rely on the military for politi-
cal enforcement because their loyalty in repressing Iranian 
citizens cannot be counted on.
One possible reason for this derives from the same com-
munal identifications that I mentioned earlier as factors in 
military violence against ethnic minorities. It is plausible 
that Egyptian and Tunisian military officers were hesitant 
to fire on protesting citizens in January and February 2011 
because of an affinity they felt for them. This is not necess-
arily a reflection of support for protesters’ grievances, but 
rather of shared identity as sons and daughters of the 
nation (if there are no communal divisions). This recogni-
tion means that officers think twice before ordering con-
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scripts to fire on protesting youth with whom they can 
identify strongly, and risking a breakdown in the chain of 
command.
This is exactly what occurred in northern Syria town of Jisr 
al-Shoughour in 2011. Lower-level desertions had been 
 reported for weeks as the regime mobilized national army 
units against protesters, but a large military operation 
against this Sunni stronghold meant that many Sunni con-
scripts were ordered to fire on townspeople. Scores refused, 
and some officers defected to aid the townspeople’s 
 resistance (Zoeph and Shadid 2011). While authoritarian 
states will vary in the degree of control and professional -
ization of the armed forces, in high-capacity regimes firing 
on citizens is not what conscripts are trained for, nor do 
middle-level  officers see maneuvers against civilians as 
their professional calling. Observers from within Syria have 
documented that the Free Syrian Army, which by early 
2012 was challenging Assad’s forces in several towns, draws 
its recruits mostly from conscripts and low-level officers 
who refuse such orders (Bilefsky 2012).
As defections mount and the tide of protest rises, the mil-
itias and special army units mentioned earlier are mobiliz-
ed. Their availability reflects how autocrats often recognize 
the gaps in repressive capability that derive from the con-
sequences of low pay and community integration of police, 
or, perhaps, ethnic and/or regional divisions in the military 
and police. In the Syrian defections, low pay, lack of morale, 
poor conditions, and shortages of food among conscripts, 
plus the Alawite-Sunni sectarian divide between officers 
and their men, were factors in the breakdown of discipline.
Another repressive strategy in these circumstances is the 
use of mercenaries as a way to buy assurance of repressive 
capability. The rationale is that because foreigners have no 
ties to the community, and because they are often eth-
nically, racially, and linguistically different from the citizen-
ry, they are more reliable perpetrators of violence – and 
perhaps more brutal. In the Bahraini protests of February 
2011, where the initial response of King Hamad ibn Isa 
Khalifa was to order the police to invade the occupation of 
the Pearl Roundabout and fire on protesters, he was able to 
count on the obedience of his security forces partly because 
many were foreigners from neighboring countries and 
from Southeast Asia (Parker and Murphy 2011). Later, he 
invited in Saudi Arabian troops to quell protests. As popu-
lar uprisings spread through the Arab world, Kaddafi in 
Libya was reported to have brought in as many as four 
thousand mercenary fighters from Niger, Mali, and Sudan’s 
Darfur region (Daragahi and Therolf 2011; Gentleman 
2011). Earlier he had also recruited Touareg from Mali and 
Niger into the Libyan Army. Their presence, plus that of the 
other the sub-Saharan mercenaries, buttressed Kaddafi’s 
control of Tripoli as other parts of the country joined the 
rebellion and units of the regular military defected (Mac-
Farquhar 2011). Mercenaries joined special militia units 
wearing red berets – as opposed to regular green army be-
rets – to assault rebellious districts in Tripoli. For the ana-
lyst sorting out the array of repressive forces deployed 
during times of protest intensification, foreign mercenaries 
enter the mix of special militias, elite units, praetorian 
guards, and loyal security forces known for their brutality.
Proposition 10. Also characteristic of lower capacity auth-
oritarian regimes tending toward the sultanistic model, is the 
use of foreign mercenaries, whose presence raises questions of 
control and risks escalating violence against civilians
Yet for mid-level party loyalists and local cadres threatened 
by protesting citizens, these kinds of repressive resources 
are typically not under their control. At these levels, it is 
more typical for local police and thugs to be called to do 
their bidding, which brings us to the next level of how viol-
ence is organized.
6.3 Thuggery and Vigilantes
 Thuggery and vigilantes in their most radical and virulent 
forms tend to be organized informally and temporarily 
outside official sanction. Here I have in mind goons, en-
forcers, and knee-cappers who are often given free reign to 
beat protesters, intimidate oppositional activists, and/or in-
still fear among the populace. While being a thug or a bully 
is an individual behavior, it is common that HCAs employ 
such people (who will, of course, vary in their predis-
positions to violence, lawlessness, and self interest) in times 
of growing oppositional mobilization and/or times of cri-
sis, as in the case of Libya, when Kaddafi armed his sup-
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porters in Tripoli to intimidate citizens from protesting 
(Therolf 2011). While such violent episodes are not easily 
amenable to systematic research, it is plausible that the 
prospect of guns and official cartes blanche to use them at-
tracts party members and friends who are prone to em-
brace opportunities for plunder, violence, and rape, rather 
than answering a “higher calling” to restore public safety.
Thuggery is also commonly employed by local agents of the 
state, not to quell protests or ensure state security in the 
broad sense, but to protect their own venal interests. In one 
example of extreme local-level thuggery in China, a 
53-year-old man named Qian Yunhui, who had relentlessly 
campaigned for six years against illegal land seizures in his 
village, was reported to have been murdered by local men. 
According to his wife, he received a phone call asking him to 
go outside his house one morning, and simply disappeared. 
An hour later, his body was found crushed beneath the tire 
of a truck, victim of an apparent accident, but villagers ear-
lier had witnessed several men holding him down in the 
road (Yang and Wong 2010). We know about this because 
pictures of his gory death were widely posted on the Chi-
nese internet. Public interest was great because because land 
disputes are common occurrences in rural China (Yang and 
Wong 2010). Similar seizures of land by local officials and 
the death of an outspoken citizen spurred an unprece-
dented rebellion of the inhabitants of Wukan village, in 
Guangdong Province in December 2011. Provincial party 
officials promised elections and investigation of corrupt real 
estate deals to diffuse the rebellion (Jacobs 2012).
In another example, two Chinese journalists were severely 
beaten by Badong County police in May 2009 as they at-
tempted to report on a case involving the rape of a young 
waitress by three party officials there. This case too drew 
significant public attention on the internet because it was a 
compelling narrative of official venality and passion – the 
waitress stabbed one of the officials in retaliation. The local 
party cadres compounded their offense by ordering the 
beatings in an attempt to block media reports of the inci-
dent. The reporters, Ms. Kong Pu from The Beijing News 
and Mr. Wei Yi from Nanfang People’s Weekly, were ar-
rested. Wei was forced to write a statement admitting that 
he “had conducted an interview without the local auth-
orities’ approval.” The audio and photo files Wei made 
during the interview were also destroyed (Ya 2009).
Proposition 11. In contrast to violence by the military or mil-
itias, thuggery is a low-level form of state violence common in 
HCAs. Its official intent is to maintain quiescence through 
fear, but often its practical effect is to reinforce free-space-
based opposition and illegitimacy.
6.4 Police and Corruption
 Similar tales of police brutality were reported as the veil of 
fear was lifted in Egypt and Tunisia in early 2011. In Russia, a 
recent poll found that one quarter of respondents had per-
sonal knowledge of incidents where the police beat or tor-
tured people. A Russian member of parliament reports: 
“Our law-enforcement organs are seriously littered with 
scum and losers of all kinds” (Loiko 2011, A4). The reason is 
that in repressive regimes the police serve those in power as 
much as (and perhaps more than) they do some abstract 
sense of the regime’s social order. Because the police are 
often enforcers of elite scams and shakedowns at national, 
regional, and local levels, the same bureaucrats and party of-
ficials are willing to turn their back on police abuses involved 
in similar corrupt activities – or even encourage them. Com-
pounding the this synergy, lower-echelon police in auth-
oritarian states are usually paid poorly, making bribes, 
shakedown, and illegal enterprises common sources of in-
come, and when this occurs, the dirty money frequently 
flows upward to elites higher up in the feeding chain. When a 
lieutenant general in the Russian Police was recently arrested 
for corruption, the investigation revealed that he had lived in 
a mansion filled with jewelry, guns, antiques, and fine art. He 
also owned five different Moscow apartments and property 
in Cyprus and London (Loiko 2011, A4). This lifestyle was 
paid for by his cut of deals and scams conducted by those 
under his authority. Moreover, it is common that many re-
gime elites know of these practices and turn a blind eye.
Although most of these observations will not surprise ana-
lysts of authoritarian states, I suggest that the use of police 
for political repression and state security – a fundamental 
principle of HCAs – has a ripple effect in local corruption 
and brutality that is perhaps less widely recognized. The re-
lationship can be summarized as follows:
IJCV : Vol. 6 (1) 2012, pp. 55 – 74
Hank Johnston: State Violence and Oppositional Protest 71
Proposition 12. Because police are the local enforcers for cor-
rupt administrators and party functionaries, the carte 
blanche they receive for low-level violence spawns lawlessness 
that permeates society and feeds free-space-based illegitimacy.
As one measure of this relationship, last February’s texting 
and twitter calls for mobilization in China (the preempted 
Jasmine revolution) were for an end to authoritarian rule, 
inflation, and widespread corruption (Jacobs and Ansfield 
2011). Another measure is that two foci of early Syrian 
protests against the al-Assad regime were the corrupt and 
unaccountable security forces (especially regarding deaths 
of detained youths) and the corrupt inner circle of Assad’s 
friends. Bashir Assad’s first cousin, Rami Maklouf, is one of 
the country’s wealthiest businessmen (Shadid 2011). Mak-
louf is known in Syria as Mr. Five Percent, reflecting his 
standard cut in deals from state contracts. His most public 
business, Syriatel, had its offices attacked during protests in 
May 2011, in an indication of public awareness of these 
inner machinations of the ruling elite. It is likely that this 
relationship between corruption and security forces was 
the force behind the widely reported frustration and anger 
that drove the recent revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, 
Bahrain, and Yemen. The empassioned narrative of the in-
communicado detention of Wael Ghonim thrust him into 
the spotlight during the Egyptian protests precisely because 
so many citizens were able to identify with it. Moreover, it 
is likely that state elites know how their subjects resent the 
pervasiveness of official corruption. In Syria, as an early 
measure to insure quiescence in Aleppo, the country’s sec-
ond largest city, the Assad regime specifically reined in cor-
rupt activities, bribe-taking, and shakedowns there. 
According to one report, “For some people, these are really 
wonderful times” (Abdulrahim 2011, 4).
At lower levels, the majority of the police and security 
forces are made up of common workers, who, in the weak 
and uneven economies of these authoritarian regimes, are 
happy to have a regular job. For many, it is their in-
stitutional role that leads them to brutish behavior, but 
when their shifts are over, they go home to family, friends, 
and neighbors, many of whom understand that the bribes 
are systemic income supplements, a regular part of doing 
business, and a way to feed the family, however distasteful. 
For the unemployed men in the neighborhood, it is plaus-
ible that most would not turn down an opportunity to put 
on the uniform to earn a living the same way. In Mexico 
under PRI authoritarianism, la mordida was resented be-
cause of its arbitrariness and its economic “bite” on 
families, but also normative and widely expected. This 
“normalization” complicates moments of political mobi-
lization at the microlevel of analysis, because the police and 
security forces are torn between their own self interest and 
orders from superiors, on the one hand, and social pressure 
from friends and family not to follow orders to repress pro-
tests on the other. A critical moment in the Tunisian mobi-
lizations was when the police and security officers refused 
to attack fellow citizens, and in turn were embraced by pro-
testers. In general, such defections mark crucial junctures 
in opposition movements. As division appears within the 
ranks of the police and security forces, on-the-ground tac-
tical assessments of advantage often appear to favor the 
protesters by virtue of their sheer numbers. When this oc-
curs, regime change is not far behind.
7. Conclusions
Authoritarian states are not monoliths of social control and 
administration. Understanding their complexity is funda-
mental to understanding how the mobilization-repression 
nexus unfolds in them, and especially the forms and fre-
quency of state violence. It is axiomatic that HCAs do not 
liberalize on their own. Even China, which since the 2008 
Olympics (and prior to 2011) had been responsive to 
citizen mobilization in some spheres – anticorruption cam-
paigns, for example – tightened social control in other 
spheres to deftly manage citizen discontent. In both expan-
sion and contraction of responsiveness, it is popular press-
ure that often forces elite action. This is the reciprocal 
relationship between regime and opposition in HCAs. The 
focus of this article has been to trace out the contours of 
how it occurs at various levels of state organization, with 
insights from a comparative focus on mid- and lower levels.
 The organization of the forces of violence, which varies by 
states according to the threats that the opposition poses to 
political elites, is especially important. I have traced several 
tactics that political elites may employ, on the one hand, to 
weaken threats from the military, especially division of 
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labor and resource allocation, and, on the other, to ensure 
repressive capacity when necessary. The organization of the 
military and militias ranges from centralization in the capi-
tal to barracks in distant peripheries of the state, which are 
often less reliable because of ethnic and/or communal divi-
sions.
 Parallel to the forces of violence are the forces of political 
control, surveillance, and fear management. These too are 
organized hierarchically and spatially, which, as for armies 
and militias, offers spaces for divisions and cracks in social 
control. At the local level there is often an overlap between 
party officials and the means of violence, as they employ 
thugs and vigilantes to enforce their interests. This is viol-
ence of the state at the micolevel, and is where the majority 
of citizens encounter an unjust and arbitrary state. But I 
also argue that the reciprocal dance between regime and 
opposition also is performed at this level too, and that cre-
ativity, bravery, and even crosscutting ties of family and 
friendship can undermine more formally organized police 
functions, which may necessitate the use of thugs and en-
forcers. These relationships raise the question of whether 
there are inherent contradictions in high-capacity auth-
oritarian states. Although they may appear quite stable in 
the short and medium term, it is an interesting proposition 
that these underlying forces may foster the gathering of op-
positional sentiments and actions in the long term, and 
contribute to a spiral of violence, retribution, opposition, 
mobilization, and elite division. I close, then, with a pro-
vocative proposition that necessarily leaves many questions 
unanswered, but consistent with the intent of this article, 
namely to guide research on state violence, repression, and 
opposition in new directions, is derived from its mid- and 
lower-level focus on repression and opposition.
Proposition 13. The complexity of HCAs gives rise to basic 
contradictions that emanate from (1) the lack of ac-
countability of political elites at various levels and the en-
suing corruption that permeates society, and (2) how hiatuses 
in the social control administration create free spaces where 
illegitimacy and opposition thrive because of point number 
one. These two patterns suggest the inherent instability of 
HCAs in the long run.
 The research task, then, is to specify why some HCAs per-
sist as long as they do, say seventy years in the Soviet 
Union, or fifty in apartheid South Africa, or fifteen years in 
Pinochet’s Chile. To answer such questions, a dialogue be-
tween the broad system-level comparisons characteristic of 
so much repression-mobilization research and the mid- 
and lower-level variables specified in this report, will likely 
be necessary.
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